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In recent years, job search models have been amended to allow for search by both employed and unemployed individuals. Among the issues addressed by empirical work on this topic has been the relative effectiveness of each type of search in producing employment outcomes. This issue is critical for determining whether or not job search is an important factor in explaining unemployment, since there may be little need to experience unemployment in searching for work.1
Unfortunately, the research to date on this issue has provided very conflicting evidence. Early papers by Mattila (1969) and Black (1980) argued that employed search produces higher wage offers than unemployed search.
However, Kahn and Low (1982) argued that unemployed search produces higher wage offers, once the self-selection of individuals into each mode of search was accounted for. More recently, Gottschalk and Maloney (1985) presented evidence that employment status per se has no significant effect on whether individuals thought they were "better off" in their new jobs, although involuntary job terminations prior to unemployment did result in more negative outcomes.
In this paper, I hope to clarify these issues by presenting new evidence on search choices and outcomes for employed and unemployed young men.
In particular, the search choices analyzed will include the reported reservation wage, the number of search methods used, and the time spent per method by each searcher. The employment outcomes considered will be the probabilities of gaining new employment by receiving and accepting job offers, as well as the wages of offers received and accepted.
The analysis is performed on data from the New Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS).
This paper thus builds on previous efforts by sorting through a more complete range of search outcomes, and by considering various search choices as sources of differences in outcomes between employed and unemployed searchers.
All of this is done within the context of a search model that predicts differences in search choices and outcomes between the two types of jobseekers, given differences in their costs of searching.
The first section of the paper summarizes the search model and its predictions regarding search choices and outcomes. The second section reports the empirical results, while the third provides a summary and conclusion.
The main findings are that unemployed young jobseekers choose lower relative reservation wages and higher levels of search effort than do employed seekers.
Both of these findings are consistent with the notion of lower utility while searching for the unemployed. Furthermore, those choices help to explain our additional findings of higher job gaining probabilities for the unemployed, which reflect higher probabilities of receiving offers and especially higher probabilities of accepting them; as well as their slightly lower accepted wages.
In short, the higher costs of search while being unemployed cause these individuals to exert more effort and to be less selective in pursuing new employment.
I. Theoretical Predictions Regarding Employed and Unemployed Search
A very standard result of the job search literature is that the probability of receiving a new job within a certain period is related to reservation wages and search effort in the following manner:
where is the probability of gaining employment, w' is the reservation wage, SE is search effort, ¶ is the probability of receiving an offer and f(w0) is the density function of wage offers facing an individual. Likewise, the expected wage of an individual conditional on gaining employment is related to his or her reservation wage:
Of course, the assumption that search effort affects offer probabilities but not wage offers is arbitrary and is made for the sake of simplicity.
Differences in these search outcomes between employed and unemployed searchers should therefore reflect differences in search choices SE and wr; as well as possible differences in the offer and wage functions which the two groups face.
There are several reasons for expecting the search choices of the two groups to differ. It is well known that, ceteris parabus, reservation wages should be inversely related to search costs, which are defined as direct costs of search plus foregone earnings (Lippman and McCall, 1976) . Thus the employed may have higher reservation wages due to lower costs of search, which in turn are made possible by the earnings which they continue to receive while searching. Lower reservation wages for the unemployed may, in fact, be part of an explicit strategy in which search continues at a higher reservation wage after an unemployed worker accepts a low-wage job (Burdett, 1978) .
Search effort is also likely to be lower for those having lower costs due to earnings.2 This factor, as well as the higher marginal value of leisure for those who also spend time working, should lead them to have lower levels of search effort than the unemployed as well.3 Of course, the crucial assumption of lower search costs for the employed rests on the notion that nonwage income sources (such as Unemployment Insurance) and value of leisure time do not fully compensate the unemployed for their loss of earnings. The model also abstracts from the effects of temporary layoffs with high probability of recall on the search effort of the unemployed.
Given these assumptions, we would predict on the basis of Equations 1) and 2) that employed searchers have lower probabilities of receiving offers, lower probabilities of accepting offers, and higher wages when offers are accepted than do unemployed searchers. However, these predictions ny change when some of the simple model's assumptions are relaxed. For instance, if search effort affects wage offers as well as offer probabilities (Kahn and Low, 1982) , the higher wages of the employed will be reduced. Furthermore, the offer probability and wage offer functions might differ between the two groups if the technology of search varies across employment states. As an example, information and personal contacts may be more accessible to employed searchers. Differences in individual characteristics between the two may work in the same direction (if, for instance, the unemployed are a lower-skilled group on average). These factors might reduce or reverse the higher predicted probability of gaining employment for the unemployed, while raising the likelihood of higher received wages for the employed. Differences in the dynamics of search choices as the spell of search proceeds might also complicate the comparison.4
Finally, all of the above is relevant only when initial employment status is exogenously determined. This is true for those whose jobs have been involuntarily terminated (Gottschalk and Maloney, 1985) as well as for those who are new entrants or reentrants to the labor force. In fact, the vast majority of the unemployed belong to one of these groups.5 But for others, employment status while searching is endogenous--one may choose to either quit into unemployment before a new job is found or remain employed. Theoretical models of the quit decision for jobseekers have been developed by Barron and McCafferty (1977) and Burdett (1978) and have been empirically tested by Black (1981) and Kahn and Low (1982, 1984) . For our purposes, we need only point out that the search choice differences predicted above should hold for job losers and labor force entrants, though not necessarily for the small number of unemployed who are job-leavers.
II. Data and !apirtcal Results
The data used in the empirical analysis below are part of the 1981 panel of the New Youth Cohort of the NLS. Despite its focus on youth, these data are very well-suited for this analysis because they contain very extensive information on search behavior and outcomes.
In particular, individuals were asked whether or not they had searched for work in the previous month.
If they had, they were then asked: which methods of search they had used,6 the amount of time spent in the previous month on each method,7 whether or not a job offer resulted, the wage of any offer made, and whether or not the job was accepted. The number of search methods used and the amount of time spent on each are used here to measure search effort. The former can be thought of as a measure of extensive effort and the latter as intensive effort.8 An additional measure of search choice is provided by responses to a question about the lowest wage an individual would accept on a hypothetical job offer, i.e., the reservation wage.
The data en job offers, acceptances, and wages are then used to measure the outcomes of search for each individual.
The sample used in the analysis includes nonenlisted and nonenrolled males between the ages of 16 and 23 who claimed to have searched for work in the previous month.9 Defining employment status of searchers was a bit more difficult.
Since unemployed searchers who had accepted job offers might be listed as currently employed, current employment status could not be used alone to define status while searching. Instead, I define unemployed searchers to be those who are currently unemployed or those who had searched for and accepted jobs in the previous month and whose employment durations are thirty days or less. Unlike previous studies, the sample here includes labor force entrants and reentrants as well as job losers and leavers among the unemployed, as well as both successful and unsuccessful searchersJ0 Taken together the results suggest a need to consider a broad range of search outcomes when discussing the effectiveness of search for each group, since data on wages imply fairly comparable outcomes between the two groups while data on offers and acceptances imply better outcomes for the unemployed.
The results also suggest the importance of considering the choices of search effort and reservation wages when comparing search outcomes for the employed and unemployed, since the summary results of Tables 1 and 2 imply that these choices and outcomes may be linked. In particular, the higher search effort and lower reservation wages of the unemployed which we observe in Table 1 are theoretically consistent with their higher job-finding rates that we observe in Table 2 .
It is also noteworthy that wage offers are higher for the employed. This suggests that wage offer distributions for the two groups of searchers may differ independently of search choices, a possibility that was discussed above. But the separate data on wage offers and received wages also enable us to see whether or not the lower reservation wages of the unemployed are simply a product of their lower wage offers. A comparison of these data in Tables 1 and 2 implies that this is not the case, since the ratio of reservation wages to offered wages among those reporting both is substantially higher among the employed than among the unemployed -- The extent to which search choices are truly exogenous with respect to observed outcomes will therefore depend on the completeness of the X variables in explaining these functions.13 As for the employment status variables, the above specification abstracts from self-selection into this status. The low fraction of the unemployed accounted for by quits (liz in this sample) implies that the assumption of exogenous employment state for most searchers is reasonable here, and the inclusion of a dummy variable for those who did quit allows for differences in the search behavior of that particular group. Table 4 presents estimates of Equations 4) and s) which decompose the probability of gaining new employment into probabilities of receiving offers and accepting theni.
The results in this table show that the unemployed (excluding job leavers) receive more offers than the employed jobseekers, though the difference is only marginally significant.
Furthermore, most of this differential disappears when the search effort variables are added to the equation. In particular, the number of search methods used has an ever larger effect on receiving offers than on gaining new employment and appears to explain most of the differential attributed to unemployed jobseeking status.17
In the equations for acceptance of offers, unemployed jobseekers accept substantially more offers than do employed jobseekers. As in Table 3 , job leavers accept fewer offers than the other unemployed but still more than employed seekers. The ratio of reservation to received wages has the expected negative effect on job acceptance and is marginally significant, although it explains only a small fraction of the coefficient on unemployed status.
Taken together, the results of Tables 3 and 4 confirm many of our previous predictions. In particular, the unemployed receive and accept more offers than do employed seekers. Virtually all of their higher rate of receiving offers and at least part of their higher rate of accepting them are due to their choices of more extensive search and lower reservation wages 195.62 -195.05 -195.05 -185.58 NOTE: Equations estimated using Probit. Equations for receiving offers include all control variables listed in Table 3 ; those for accepting offers include only those for missing values. Sample sizes are 1045 for offer equations and for acceptance equations.
Time spent variables are measured in hours.
respectively.
Furthermore, it is quite likely that the true effect of reservation wages on the differential acceptance rate is understated here, due to the problems of measurement error in reservation wages and unobservable skills.18 In fact, the acceptance or rejection of offers in virtually all job search models is caused exclusively by comparisons of wage offers and reservation wages, which would imply that all of the differential between the unemployed and employed reflects relative differences in their true (as opposed to observed) reservation and offered wages. Either way, the role of search choices in explaining differences between employed and unemployed jobseeking outcomes appears to be fairly important; and observed differences in both choices and outcomes conform quite well to the predictions of the theory outlined above.
In Table 5 we turn to estimates of Equations 6) and 7) for offered and accepted wages. The results indicate that both offered and accepted wages are just a bit higher for employed seekers when controlling for personal characteristics, though the differences are not significant in either case.
The search effort measures seem to have few (or incorrect) effects on wages.
However, reported reservation wages have large and significant effects on received wages. In fact, their inclusion reverses the direction of the effect of unemployed job search from a negative to a positive one on received wages.
This positive effect is largest for unemployed job leavers.
Of course, the direction of the bias on coefficients for reservation wages in these equations is less clear than in employment equations, since unobserved skill now has a positive rather than negative effect on estimated results.'9
But even if the measured reservation wage captures heterogenity as well as true search choices, it appears to be responsible for the higher (or comparable) wages employed jobseekers receive in summary measures and in Table 3 . Dependent variables appear in natural logarithms. Sample sizes are 254 for offered wage equations and 173 for accepted wage equations. Time spent variables are measured in hours.
Relative reservation wages are defined as the ratio of reservation to offered wages. An extra dummy variable has been added for cases where offered wages are missing.
Once again, differences in search choices between the employed and unemployed jobseekers help to explain search outcomes which we observe for the two groups.
III. Conclusion
In this paper I argue that the higher costs of search for unemployed as opposed to employed jobseekers should lead the former to undertake high levels of search effort and to have lower reservation wages relative to offered wages.
These predictions are borne out by empirical evidence on young male jobseekers which shows that the number of search methods used and the time spent per method are higher for unemployed searchers, while their relative reservation wages are lower. Furthermore, these differences in search choices help to explain some of the differences in outcomes which we also observe between the two groups. In particular, the higher number of search methods used explains most of the higher probability of receiving offers which we find for the unemployed. Also, the lower relative reservation wages of the unemployed explain at least part of the substantially higher job acceptance rate and mildly lower received wage rates which we find for that group. All of this is consistent with a picture of unemployed searchers being more eager to find new work, given the higher costs of search which they bear.
A few important caveats must be kept in mind when considering these results.
For one thing, they do not appear to hold for those who select unemployed jobseeking status by leaving their previous jobs. However, such
jobseekers. Measurement problems and other econometric issues also create biases here which leave the exact magnitudes of search choice effects on outcome very uncertain. Finally, the focus on young jobseekers enables us to downplay the importance of Unemployment Insurance and temporary layoffs, though these factors are probably more critical for older cohorts.
Despite these difficulties, the evidence strongly suggests that the search choices of employed and unemployed jobseekers differ and that these choices have important effects on the differences in outcomes which we observe between the two groups.
FOOTNOTES
1For instance, the claim has been made that reservation wages should be irrelevant, and no one should ever tun down a job offer, if they can continue to search as (or more) effectively while being employed. See Clark and Summers (1979) for such a claim, and Burdett (1978) for a model which incorporates such a notion.
2Yoon (1981) have led us to omit this variable from these equations as well.
estimation of independent equations for wage and employment outcomes of search follows Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) . More structural models of the search process have recently been developed by Kiefer and Neumann (1979) , among others.
15The coefficient on the quit variable must be added to that of the unemployment variable, since both have a value of one for job leavers. The variable in the ilLS which was used to create the dummy variable for quits was the one which establishes reason for unemployment--job leaving, job loss, etc.
Since this question was also asked only of the currently unemployed, there were no responses for many of the unemployed who had accepted jobs and begun working.
In particular, 14% of those counted as unemployed in this sample failed to answer this question, though these individuals account for 33% of those receiving offers and 397. of those accepting offers. This higher omission rate among successful searchers thus suggests that estimated effects of the quit variable on employment outcomes may be biased downwards.
16The finding that the number of search methods used has a significant positive effect on employment probabilities stands in sharp contrast to the recent results of Keeley and Robbins (1985) , who found negative effects. Possible reasons for the discrepancy include differences in samples and in specifications. In particular, they use intermediate outcomes 
